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NOTES.
CARRIERS-WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INTERSTATE SHIPMENT?
-Inasmuch as the federal government and the states have differ-
ent requirements as to the limitation of liability and the giving of
notice in case of loss or damage, and have different rates for the va-
rious services, 'and different regulations as to hours of employment,
equipment, etc., it must be noticed in each case whether the ship-
ment has been intrastate or interstate, so as to determine whether
the national or state authority applies. Ordinarily this is not per-
plexing but in numerous cases the question has arisen in such a
manner as to make its solution difficult.
This is shown in a recent Missouri case" where there was a
continuous shipment between points in different states. The line
of the carrier to whom the goods were originally delivered did
State v. Nortoni, TST S. W. 995 (T916).
(613)
614 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
not extend beyond the state, but at the end of this line the goods
were transferred to a second carrier and were taken into another
state. It was held to be an intrastate shipment insofar as the or-
iginal carrier participated in-it.
In dealing with cases of this nature the courts have failed to
lay down any definite test whereby the character of the shipment
may be determined and the result of the decisions may be best
understood by reviewing a few of the cases of high authority. In
the first place it cannot be disputed that if a carrier participates in
an interstate shipment, it is subject to federal regulation although
its line may lie wholly within the limits of the state.2 Such a rule,
however, in no way determines . what is interstate commerce, al-
though it is cited in some cases for such a purpose, but merely
states that all carriers, regardless of situation, transporting inter-
state commerce can to that extent be regulated by Congress.
An important case dealing with the question presented in
the principal case is Gulf Railway Company v. Texas,3 in which
a shipment was made from another state to a point in. Texas.
After several days a new bill of lading was taken out and the
goods sent to another point in Texas in the same cars, the seals
not having been broken. The court held that the last stage, of
the transit must be regarded as intrastate commerce, and declared
the intention of the shipper immaterial in determining the nature
of the transportation.
Several years later the court dealt with the same problem in
Southern Pacific Terminal Company v. Interstate Commerce Com-
mission.4 In that case an exporter, who was given the privilege
of doing business on one of the railroad's piers had cottonseed
consigned to him from points within the state. At the pier it was
ground into meal, sacked, and later exported. It was decided that
the shipment to the pier from within the state was interstate com-
merce. In this case the court was undoubtedly anxious to declare
this movement an interstate shipment so that they might bring
this carrier within the scope of federal legislation and thereby
do away with an undue preference granted exclusively to this one
exporter, as the decision shows a departure from the rules of the
preceding decision. The shipment, declared by the court to be
interstate, was made under a bill of lading which covered only
the transit within the state, and at the end of this shipment the
goods were actually manufactured into a different form and held
for some time before being reshipped. The court said that although
the original contract of carriage had been completed within the
state, still it was the intention of the purchaser to send the goods
'The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 557 (187o).
'204 U. S. 403 (9o6).
2ig U. S. 498 (I9go); accord, Railroad Commission v. Worthington,
225 U. S. 101 (1912).
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in foreign commerce, and the court would be guided by that in-
tention; and yet in the Gulf Railway case,G this same court said
the intention as to future disposition was immaterial.
In the case of Texas, etc., Railway v. Sabine Tram Com-
pany,6 where lumber was shipped between two points under a local
bill of lading and afterwards reshipped in foreign commerce, it
was held that the initial shipment was an interstate carriage. The
decision reaffirmed the point of the prior case that the form of
the bill of lading should not determine the question and declared
that the character of the shipment must depend on "the essential
nature of the commerce". It is obvious that such a test is of
very little, if any, practical value as the whole problem is to de-
termine what is the essential nature of the commerce.
The last decision of the Supreme Court upon this question is
interesting in that it seems to depart from the rules of two pre-
ceding cases and closely follows the decision of the first case con-
sidered, the Gulf Railway case. In Chicago, etc., Railway v. Iowa,
coal was shipped from points in Illinois to Iowa and there re-
shipped to various towns in the state. This practice was resorted
to by the shippers so as to benefit by the local rates, the sum of
which was less than the through interstate rate. The railroad
thereupon refused to carry coal after the reconsignment unless the
coal was transfei:red to their own cars, and later refused to obey
an order issued by the state commission compelling them to carry
the coal. The Supreme Court held that the order must be obeyed
as the final shipment was one of intrastate commerce. In this
case no importance was attached to the fact that the shipments
were made in this manner so as to secure a rate lower than the
interstate rate.
Finally, in a late case decided by the Interstate Commerce
Commission,8 in which shippers of oil divided the transit so as to
profit by a low intrastate rate it was held that the regular inter-
state rate must be paid, since the practice was nothing more than
a scheme to have the oil delivered at a rate lower than the lawful
rate. The Commission seemed to base their decision on the ground
that it was the intention of the shipper to make an interstate ship-
ment ultimately, although separate bills of lading were taken out.
This test, the intention of the shipper, was set forth in the Gulf
Railway case,9 but was rejected in the Pacific Terminal case.10 The
Supra, note 3.
0227 U. S. III (1912); accord, Louisiana v. Texas and Pacific Rail-
Way, 229 U. S. 336 (1912).
'233 U. S. 334 (1913).
'Kanotex Refining Co. v. A. T. and S. F. Rwy. Co., 34 I. C. C. 271 (1915).
'Supra, note 3.
"Supra, note 4.
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Commission also laid much stress on the fact that it was a scheme
to secure lower rates, and yet in the case just preceding the Su-
preme Court did not consider this element in reaching their decision,
although the same practice existed.
The problem involved in all these decisions is vital alike to
the carrier and the shipper. Clearly it would be unwise to adopt
as a test the form of the contract of shipment because, as is shown
in the cases, that would afford an easy method of evading federal
control in a great many instances. Nor would it be satisfactory
to say that the question must be decided by the essential nature
of the commerce. It is suggested that the courts might hold that
where there is an intent to consign the goods to some ultimate
point beyond the state borders, then in all cases, except where
the goods are held up to be manufactured into a different form,
or to be stored for a long period or where in some other manner
the regular continuity of the shipment is broken, the movement
will be regarded as interstate commerce until that ultimate point
is reached. Such a rule could be easily applied in practically all
cases and would not only prevent attempts to avoid federal au-
thority but would also render the law certain where it is now
uncertain, and thus avoid endless confusion.
I. McK. B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-
STATE LEGISLATION DISCRIMINATING AGAINST ALIEN.-Several
cases recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United States
tend to indicate how far a state may go in enacting legislation dis-
criminating against aliens. This question is of practical importance,
in view of the attitude of many of the states toward foreigners,
notably that of California toward the Japanese. The most common
form of discriminatory legislation of this sort consists of statutes
denying to aliens the right to labor or to engage in certain trades.
In Tritax v. Raich 1 the Supreme Court had to decide upon the
validity of an Arizona statute which provided that every person
employing more than five workers at one time, regardless of the
kind of work, should employ not less than eighty per cent qualified
.citizens of the United States. On the complaint of a native of
Austria, engaged as a cook in an Arizona restaurant and threatened
with dismissal as a result of the statute, it was held that the act
was unconstitutional because in violation of that clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment which provides that no state shall deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The court held that since the authority to admit or exclude aliens
is solely in the federal government, a statute could not deny to
'United States Supreme Court Advance Opinions, Dec. i, T915, p. 7.
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aliens, lawfully admitted, the opportunity to earn a living, since
such denial is practically the same as preventing their entrance and
abode, on the theory that "they cannot live where they cannot
work."
So far as its actual decision goes, this case does not declare any
new principle, but merely reiterates the doctrine established in the
leading case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2 namely, that aliens are
protected by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The
opinion of the court, however,4 is illuminating because it tends to
clarify the issue as to the relation of the police power of the states
to statutes discriminating against aliens, an issue considerably con-
fused by the discussions of several state courts.
In Trageser v. Gray' the Court of Appeals of Maryland de-
cided that a statute which denied to aliens the right to obtain a
liquor license, but allowed all other persons to become licensed
liquor retailers, was not in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 The court apparently reached its
conclusion on the ground that the police force of the state is su-
preme and unrestricted. To what conclusion such reasoning may
lead is well illustrated by the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth
v. Hana 7 where it was decided that a state in the exercise of its
police power may grant peddling licenses to citizens only. Because
the business of peddling enables one to practice fraud, the court
says, it is a proper subject for state regulation. It is obvious that
this argument may apply with equal force to almost any trade or
occupation.
The fallacy underlying the doctrine of these cases is the notion
that the police power of the states is unrestricted, and unlimited.
As a matter of fact, the federal Constitution has made numerous
restrictions upon the police power, notably the limitations imposed
by the commerce clause. It is true that a valid exercise of the
police power is paramount to the Fourteenth Amendment, but it
is equally true that the legislation which purports to be a police
: 118 U. S. 356 (i885), where an ordinance of the city of San Francisco
was struck down because it was so enforced as to withhold from the Chinese
the right to pursue the laundry business.
3 In accord is Fraser v. McConway and Torley Company, 82 Fed. 257
(i897) where a Pennsylvania statute which imposed upon employers of un-
naturalized male persons a tax of three cents per day for each day every
such person was employed, and authorized the employer to deduct the amount
of the tax from the wages of such employees, was held unconstitutional.
'In the principal case, supra, note i.
'73 Md. 250 (189o).
' The Pennsylvania Act of May 13, 1887, P. L. io8, Sec. 2, similarly
provides, as do many state statutes, that licenses for the retail sale of liquors
shall only be granted to citizens of the United States. Its validity was not
questioned in In re Hay's License, 3 Mont. Co. Reg. I88 (1887).
'81 N. E. i49 (Mass. i9o7).
'Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1885).
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measure must have a real and substantial relation to the end sought
to be accomplished. The Maryland court failed to indicate what
possible relation the discriminatory statute had to the health, safety,
or morals. Furthermore, while it is true that the states can pro-
hibit the sale of liquor altogether, it would seem that until made
unlawful, the liquor business is one in which, subject to proper
regulations, all persons may engage. A regulation forbidding aliens
to sell liquor or to peddle, merely because they happen to be aliens,
is, it is submitted, arbitrary and improper, and in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Following the reasoning here suggested, the Maine case of
State v. Montgomery 9 decided thai a statute similar to the one con-
sidered in Commonwealth v. Hana'o was unconstitutional. In an-
swer to the contention that the state could, in the exercise of its
police power, forbid aliens to peddle, the court said, "It must be
noticed that the discrimination is not against a class, as criminals,
as paupers, as intemperate, as disqualified by character or habit, or
as harmful to society, but a class solely as aliens. Such a discrimi-
nation is forbidden." And similarly in Templar v. State Exam-
iners" it was held that a statute prohibiting aliens from being
barbers, the barber business being admittedly subject to police
regulations by the state, was unconstitutional because it violated
the equal protection clause.
A case which may be considered, on first blush, an authority
in support of the doctrine of Trageser v. Gray, 2 is the Supreme
Court decision of Patsone v. Pennsylvania." It is submitted, how-
ever, that this case has no bearing whatever upon the question of
the police power of the state. The Pennsylvania act of May 8,
19o9, which was there held constitutional, made it unlawful for
unnaturalized residents to kill wild game, and to that end made
the possession of shot guns and rifles unlawful. The court did
not sustain this statute as a legitimate exercise of the police power,
but rather because the subject-matter of the legislation was wild
game. The statute, it was pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes, did
not prohibit the possession of all deadly weapons, but only those
peculiarly appropriate to hunting wild game, viz., shot guns and
rifles. It is well settled that a state, in regulating the public domain
or the common property and resources within its jurisdiction, may
discriminate in favor of its own citizens as against both aliens and
citizens of other states. In Truax v. Raich,14 Mr. Justice Hughes
interprets Patsone v. Pennsylvania "- as analogous in principle to the
'94 Me. 192 (i9oo). See also 4 Harv. L. Rev. 337 (I89i).
" Supra, note 7.
23 1 Mich. 254 (902).
"Supra. note 5.
"232 U. S. 138 (i9r4).
'* Supra, note I.
"Supra, note 22.
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case of McCready v. Virginia,16 where the restriction to the citizens
of Virginia of the right to plant oysters in one of its rivers was
sustained upon the ground that the regulation related to the com-
mon property of the citizens of the state. This judicial interpreta-
tion clearly shows that the Pennsylvania statute forbidding aliens
to possess rifles and shot guns was upheld not because it was a
proper exercise of the police power, but because it sought to protect
the wild game of the commonwealth.' 7
It therefore may be stated definitely that, so far as the Su-
preme Court has decided the question, a state, although avowedly
exercising its police power, cannot deny to lawful inhabitants, merely
because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning
a livelihood.
There is, however, one class of work from which aliens may
be barred by the states. In the two recent cases of Heim v.
McCall'" and Crane v. New York,'0 the Supreme Court of the
United States sustained a New York statute providing that only
citizens of the United States should be employed jn the construction
of public work for the state or any of its municipalities. The
court reaffirmed the doctrine laid down in Atkins v. Kansas:20 "It
belongs to the state, as the guardian and trustee for its people, and
havingcontrol of its affairs, to presribe the conditions upon which
it will permit public work to be done on its behalf, or on behalf of
its municipalities."
Alienage, as opposed to citizenship, may, therefore, be made
the basis of legislative classification in certain cases, as where the
subject-matter of the legislation is the right to own or inherit real
property, to shoot wild game, to plant oysters, to be employed by
the state, etc.21 It is submitted, however, that in the exercise of
the police power, alienage cannot be a proper basis of classification,
for there is in the nature of things no real. and substantial relation
between such discrimination and the promotion of the health, safety,
morals; and welfare of those within the jurisdiction of the state."2
L.E.L.
694 U. S. 391 (1876).
'The Pennsylvania Act of June I, 1915, P. L. 645, goes still further.
"To give additional protection to wild birds and game within the state" it
makes unlawful the possession by aliens of dogs of any kind. Whether this
statute comes within the decision of the principle of Patsone v. Pennsyl-
vania is questionable, to say the least. There can be no reasonable connec-
tion between the possession by an alien of a pet dog and the legislative
desire to preserve the wild game of the state.
s36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78 (191s).
1"36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85 (1915).
20 191 U. S. 201 (1903).
'As to the rights of Japanese in California Schools see 16 Yale L. Jour.
go (Dec., 19o6).
"Supra, note 8, note 17; State v. Montgomery, supra, note 9; Templar
v. State Examiners, supra, note ii.
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DIVORCE IN ENGLAND--RECRIMINATION-A CONTRAST-When
told of the inequality of the English law in the case of women
we are all more or less incredulous. But two cases printed side
by side in a recent number of the Law Times depict more elo-
quently than a dozen addresses the extraordinary double standard
of morals that prevails in a country so advanced in some respects,
yet so backward in others. The facts briefly digested are sufficient
without comment.
In Goddard v. Goddard I the wife, the petitioner, testified that
from the commencement of the married life the respondent, the
husband, had treated her with the grossest cruelty, frequently black-
ing her eyes. On one occasiorr he seized her by the hair and
dragged her out of bed. On another, he knocked her down in the
street when she was carrying a child and the child died in conse-
quence. In 19o2 he deserted her and went to live with another
woman with whom he thereafter resided. The petitioner then went
to work in a factory but her health gave way and her earnings fell
to nine shillings a.week. Her children were both delicate, one of
them consumptive. She consulted a solicitor about a divorce but
the costs were prohibitive. She then went to work as a house-
keeper and after her employer's death lived with his son as his
mistress because he took pity on her and was willing to make a
home for her children. He was now anxious to marry her if the
court were to grant her a decree. The court said: "I.do not tHink
the husband's conduct ought to have conduced. It may have con-
duced but I do not think it ought to have done so." The petition
was dismissed.
On the following day before the same judge was heard the
case of Clutterbuck v. Clutterbuck.2 There the petition was by a
minor suing by his father as guardian for a dissolution of his mar-
riage. The testimony was that the petitioner, nineteen years of
age, met the respondent while at a public school; that in December
of 1914 he obtained a commission in a regiment and married the
respondent January 23, 1915. They were together only occasionally
and at the end of March, 1915, the respondent went away with
the co-respondent, writing to the petitioner that she was going to
leave him forever. The petitioner testified that in consequence of
this letter he was terribly depressed and while in a state of despair
committed adultery on two occasions. The court said: "The letter
of 3ISt March may have caused absolute desperation, and I think
that the petitioner's adultery was the direct result of his wife's
conduct towards him. In the special circumstances of the case I
will exercise my discretion and grant the petitioner a decree nisi."
W. H. L.
113 LAW TIMES 1063 (1915).
2113 LAW TIMES 1063 (1915).
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MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-
ABOLITION OF REMEDY AGAINST THIRD PERSONS-A very nice
problem arising under workmen's compensation laws is that in-
volving the situation where a workman has been injured' under
such circumstances as to create a legal liability in some third person,
not the employer, although the injury has occurred in the course
of the employee's employment and upon the premises of the em-
ployer. Is the workman's right to sue such third person abolished,
or is the workman forced to elect between the third person and
the employer in his recovery of compensation, or has he a double
remedy?
The Washington act ' provides that each workman "who shall
be injured whether upon the premises, or at the plant, or, he being
in the course of his employment, away from the plant of his em-
ployer", shall receive compensation out of the accident fund, and
that such payment "shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action
whatsoever against any person whomsoever".-
This section of the act was first considered in Peet v. Millss
in which a motorman was injured in a collision between two trains,
due to the failure to use the block signal system with which the
road was equipped, the operation of which had been forbidden
by the president of the road. An action was brought against the
president personally, based upon negligence. It was held that the
action was improperly brought, and that compensation could be
recovered from the company alone, because "the compensation pro-
vided by the act in case of injury to any workman in any hazardous
occupation was intended to be exclusive of every other remedy, and
all causes of action theretofore existing except as they are saved
by the provisos of the act are done away with."
The next and last case involving this point is Meese v. Northern
Pacific Railway Company.4  An employee of a brewery was killed
while loading kegs in a freight car by the negligence of an engineer
of the railway company. Although the accident occurred upon the
premises of the brewing company, the decedent's dependents
brought an action at law against the railroad company. A demur-
'Wash. Sess. Laws, 19ti, Chap. 74, Sec. 5, P. 345.
' Section 5 is qualified by the following proviso in section 3: "If the
injury to a workman occurring away from the plant of his employer is
due to the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, the
injured workman, or if death results, his dependents, shall elect whether to
take under this act or seek a remedy against such other, and if he take under
this act the cause of action against such other shall be assigned to the
state for the benefit of the accident fund; if the other choice is made the
accident fund shall contribute only the deficiency, if any, between the amount
of recovery against such third person actually collected and the compensa-
tion provided or estimated by this act for such case."
3-6 Wash. 437 (1913).
' 206 Fed. 222 (1913).
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rer to the complaint was sustained, the opinion of the court being
that the proviso in Section 3 5 expressly preserving the right of
action at law for the death of an employee resulting from an iPjury
"occurring away from the plant of the employer", clearly showed
an intention to except from that provision of the act, which abol-
ished all private controversies and all rights of civil action, what,
but for such provision, would have been abolished, and that, as
the right of civil action was alone preserved when the injury oc-
curs "away from the plant of the employer", then it was not pre-
served when it occurred at the plant of the employer.
The argument that the act took away a right of action existing
at common law was answered in -these words: "There is no right
of action at common law to recover for death occasioned by the
wrongful act of another. It is a right solely given by statute. A
right such as this, which the legislature gives, it may, of course, take
away".8
The Circuit Court of Appeals 7 reversed the District Court,
holding that the act applied only as between employer and employee,
and had no effect upon the relation of employee and third person.8
The Peet v. Mills case 9 was distinguished on the ground that there
the injury was caused by the negligence of the president of the
railroad, that is, one who was in the same employ with the work-
man.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a case recently
decided,10 has overruled the Court of Appeals' decision and sus-
tained the District Court, holding that the decision of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in Peet v. Mills 11 was binding upon it. being
the construction of a state statute deliberately adopted by its highest
tribunal. 2 The suggestion that a construction of the act which
took away the employee's or his dependents' right of action against
a third person whose negligence was the cause of the injury or
death, violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was said to be "without merit."
5 Supra, note 2.
As a sidelight it is interesting to note that the constitutionality of the
Washington Act, which is compulsory, was attacked. A very few words
sufficed to dismiss the point. "Upon the argument much was said concerning
the constitutionality of a legislative act compelling contribution from one
person, or employer, to be used in paying for the negligence of another.
This phase of the act is not now before the Court. That is a defense only
to be made by those obliged to contribute to, or those charged with the duties
of administering the funds contributed."
'Meese v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 211 Fed. 254 (1914).
'Cf. Smale v. Wright Washer Mfg. Co., i6o Wis. 331 (1915).
'Supra, note 3.
"Northern Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Meese (i916), U. S. Adv. Ops. 1915, p. 223.
u Supra, note 3.
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U. S. ioo (1912); Fairfield v.
Gallatin County, ioo U. S. (1879).
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It is to be noted that while the District Court, in upholding
the act, distinctly said that in this case the action was for the
recovery of damages for the death of the employee, and that this
right of action could be taken away, being merely statutory, the
Supreme Court has made no distinction between action by the
employee for injuries and actions by his dependents for his death.
The former right of action existed at common law; the second right
is purely statutory. The further fact that the opinion of the Su-
preme Court is based upon Peet v. Mills, in which the employee
was suing for injuries received, justifies the conclusion that the de-
cision in this case lays down the principle that the state legislature
may abolish a right of action which existed at common law, just as
it may abolish the common law defences..
3
A large number of compensation statutes have specific pro-
visions covering cases where the injury creates a legal liability in a
third person. The English act 14 provides that, under such cir-
cumstances, the workman may take proceedings both against the
third person to recover damages and against any person liable to
pay compensation under the act for such compensation, but shall
not be entitled to recover both damages and compensation.' 5
The Pennsylvania act' 6 provides that "where a third person
is liable to the employee or the depehdents for the injury or death,
the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employee or
th dependents against such third person, but only to the extent of
the compensation payable under this article by the employer. Any
recovery against such third person in excess of the compensation
theretofore paid by the employer shall be paid forthwith to the
employee or to the dependents, and shall be treated as an advance
payment by the employer on account of any future installments of
compensation."
The questions presented by the Pennsylvania act are whether
the employer who has paid compensation can compel the employee
to sue on his right of action against the third person or whether
the employer can sue the third person in his own name, if the em-
ployee refuses to sue, and also what rights of intervention the em-
ployer has, if the employee himself does sue.
P.C.W.
"Second Employers' Liability Cases, 233 U. S. I (I9u).
"6 Edw. VII, Chap. 58, Sec. 6 (i9o6).
" See also Act June 28, 1913, Sec. 29, Ill. Laws 1913, p. 335; Mass. Act
i911, p. 998, Chap. 751, Part III, Sec. 15, as amended by Mass. Acts 1913,
p. 37 r , Chap. 448; Wis. Rev. St. ig, Chap. iloa, Sec. 2394-25, p. 1541. The
Wisconsin Act provides that the making of a lawful claim against an em-
ployer for compensation under the act for the injury or death of his em-
ployee shall operate as an assignment of any cause of action in tort which
the employee or his personal representative may have against any other
party for such injury or death and the employer may enforce this liability
in his own name.
"Act June 2, I915, P. L. 736, Art. III, Sec. 319.
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MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKIMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-
TEMPORARY ILLNESS AS A CONTRIBUTING CAUSE OF AN ACCIDENT
ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT.-The great majority of states
which have passed workmen's compensation acts, slavishly follow-
ing the English act'- and, taking it for better or for worse, have
provided as a condition precedent to the right to compensation that
the injured employee must prove that he was injured in an accident
which arose "out of" and "in the course of" the employment. The
results of the phraseology have been both unfortunate and unsatis-
factory, principally due to the fact that upon the happening of any
given accident it has not been possible to ascertain with any degree
of certainty whether the employee is or is not entitled to compensa-
tion.2 It seems that the general principles which have been derived
from the application of the phrase "arising out of and in the course
of the employment" are either most vague and indefinite or else
purely arbitrary. This is especially true of the words "arising
out of".3
A recent Rhole Island case 4 is illustrative of the kind of diffi-
culties which may arise in an endeavor to apply this phrase to a
given state of facts. Here a hackman, while driving, lost con-
sciousness because of an attack of hernia and fell to the street,
sustaining severe injuries. The question whether this was an injury
which arose out of his employment was decided by the court in
the affirmative. It was strenuously argued that the accident could
not be said to have arisen out of the employment but was solely
due to the previously diseased condition of the employee. The
court, however, held that the- fall, and not the disease which oc-
casioned the fall,- was the effective and so the proximate cause of
the injury. There was a dissenting opinion based on two grounds:
first, that the claimant had not discharged the onus of proof in-
cumbent upon him inasmuch as he had not sufficiently shown that
his unconsciousness was not the sole cause 9 f the fall, and secondly,
that the unconsciousness was the proximate cause of the injury
and there being no relation between the employment and the cause
'The Workmen's Compensation Act, 19o6 (6 Edw. VII, Chap. 58).
2 See the articles by Prof. Francis H. Bohlen on "The Drafting of Work-
men's Compensation Acts," 25 Harv. L. Rev. 328, 401, 517, especially 537-547.
'California (Laws 1913, Chap. 176) in adopting this phraseology, has
been especially arbitrary in the distinctions drawn and it is difficult to see
how the various decisions can be reconciled. Where the injury complained
of is due in a large measure to a pre-existing physical impairment or a
congenital defect then compensation is allowed for the full period of disabil-
ity, but where it is due to such constitutional diseases as tuberculosis,
syphilis, or chronic alcoholism then the injured employee is not entitled to
compensation for the extended period of disability (2 Ind. Acc. Com. 249,
Cal. 1915; Spangler v. Philbin, ibid. 158). The decisions in many of the
other states which have adopted this phraseology are likewise confusing
but not to such a marked degree.
Carroll v. What Cheer Stables Co., 96 At. 208 (R. 1. 1916).
NOTES
of the accident, it could not be said that the injury arose out of
the employment. That this view is narrow and unsatisfactory is
apparent from an examination of the English and American cases
of this class.
In Wicks v. Dowell and Company,' a workman, afflicted with
an epileptic seizure while working near the open hatchway of a
vessel, fell into the hold. He was allowed to recover for the re-
sulting injuries. In the course of the opinion it was said, "How
does it come about that the accident arose out of the employment?
Because by the conditions of his employment the workman was
bound to stand on the edge of a precipice, and if in that position
he was seized with a fit he would almost necessarily fall over. If
that is so, the accident is caused by his necessary proximity to the
precipice." This clearly shows that the court considered the fall,
and not the fit which occasioned the fall, to be the proximate cause
of the injury.
This case was cited with approval and followed in the Massa-
chusetts case of Driscoll v. Cushman's Express Company 6 where
the driver of an express wagon became faint while driving and
fell from his seat. Here again, the court laid stress upon the fact
that the employee was exposed to a substantial and increased risk
owing to his occupation. The same result was reached in an opinion
of the solicitor of the Department of Commerce and Labor 7 where
a night watchman lost consciousness, fell into a camp-fire and was
burned. But in Wisconsin, an injury due to an epileptic seizure or
temporary illness is not compensible apparently unless the physical
condition of the surroundings are unusual."
The ratio decidendi in the English cases, on which most of the
American cases are based, is difficult and almost impossible to ascer-
tain. One of the tests often given is whether it is "a risk to which
the workman is exposed by the nature of the employment"!, This
is clearly too broad, as a risk to which he is subjected to in common
with all humanity is a risk incidental to his very existence rather
than one incidental to his employment. In the class of cases under
consideration it has been suggested that the particular case depends
upon this question: "Was it the disease that did it or did the
work he was doing help in any material degree" ?1o What is ma-
terial is apparently a question to be decided in each case as it arises.
52 K. B. 225 (19o).
ar Mass. W. C. C. 125 (1913).
"In re Clements. Op. Sol. Dept. Labor, 228 (1915 Ed.).
'Kowalski v. Trostel & Sons, 4 Wis. W. C. Ann. Rep. 17 (1912).
'Lord Kinnear in M'Lauchlan v. Anderson, 4 B. W. C. C. 376, 378
(Eng. igir).
"Lord Loreburn in the leading case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes,
3 B. W. C.-C. 275, 281 (Eng. I9IO)..
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In Wicks v. Dowell" the work and the conditions of the work in
which the injured employee was engaged at the time of the accident
were considered to have brought about the fall which was the
causa proxima of his injuries. On the other hand in Butler v.
Burton-on-Trent Union 12 a workhouse master, who fell from the
top of a flight of stairs, where he was sitting on evening duty, be-
cause of a fit of tubercular coughing, was denied recovery on the
ground that the accident did not arise out of the employment and
was not due to anything to which the employment required him to
expose himself, and hence the work he was doing did not help to
cause the injuries in any material degree. But even this test will
not explain the dicta in some of the cases, though a further con-
sideration of them here would be useless.
So even in the light of the cases that have arisen it is doubtful
if any general principles do exist. In Haley v. United Collieries,"
Lord Kyllachy in discussing the question, said, "It cannot be solved
by reference to any formula or general principle, but must always
depend on the circumstances of each case." That Lord Loreburn
likewise shares this opinion is evident from the following state-
ment: "Other cases are only useful as illustrations of the way irl
which these words are applied, and nothing is more fruitless than
to attempt to argue by analogy from one set of facts to another
set of facts".' 4
As the purpose of a workman's compensation act is to provide
compensation to the injured employee without his b9ing forced to
spend his wages in endless litigation, any act containing these words
would seem to have partially failed in its purpose. It is noteworthy
that six states, including Pennsylvania,15 have omitted the words
"arising out of" from their respective acts thereby undoubtedly pre-
venting a great amount of unnecessary litigation.
D.R.H.
TORTS-LORD CAMPBELL'S LEGISLATION-DOES A RECOVERY OF
DAMAGES By DECEDENT BAR AN ACTION FOR DEATH By His Ai-
MINISTRATOR?-At common law, the right of action for an injury
to the person abated upon the death of the party injured,' according
to the familiar maxim, actio personalis moritur cume persona; and
by a second rule, no civil action could be maintained against any-
'Sufpra, note 6.
125 B. W. C. C. 355 (Eng. 1912).
" (i9o6-197o) Scot. Sess. Cas., 214, 216.
"Walters v. Stavely Coal & Iron Co., Ltd., 4 B. W. C. C. 303, 305
(Eng. 1911).
IAct of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736.
'Pulling v. Rwy. Co., 9 Q. B. D. rIO (Eng. 1882); Hadley v. Bryars'
Adm'r, 58 Ala. 185 (1877).
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one for causing the death of a human being.2 Lord Campbell's act,3
passed in England in 1846, and speedily followed in this country,
by similar legislation, overthrew these old rules.
This legislation is of two classes: first, acts which may be
called "survival acts," which abolish the first of the common law
rules mentioned above, and provide that the decedent's cause of
action against the wrongdoer shall survive, either for the benefit
of his estate generally, or for the benefit of certain persons named
in the statute; second, those which, based more or less directly on
Lord Campbell's act, do away with the second rule, and give sub-
stantially a new cause of action to certain described beneficiaries
for loss sustained by them due to the death of the injured person.
These two kinds of statutes should be clearly distinguished, though
in some jurisdictions both provisions are combined in one enact-
ment.
Under Lord Campbell's act and similar acts giving a right of
action for death caused by the wrongful act of another, the courts
have frequently been puzzled by the question whether such right of
action is barred where the decedent himself has during his life-
time recovered damages from the wrongdoer for the injury which
subsequently caused his death. This problem is well presented in a
recent North Carolina case. A person who was injured by the negli-
gence of another brought an action for the injury and recovered a
judgment which was duly satisfied. Later death resulted from the
same injury for which this judgment had been rendered. The ad-
ministratrix of the decedent then brought an action against the
wrongdoer, under a statute substantially similar to Lord Camp-
bell's act. The opinion of the court, from which one judge strongly
dissented, was that the action was barred by the satisfied judgment
recovered by the decedent during his lifetime.4
Statutes of the kind under consideration provide in general
that whenever the death of any person is caused by the wrongful
act, neglect, or default of another, in such a manner as would have
entitled the party injured to have maintained an action thereof if
death had not ensued, an action may be maintained if brought
within twelve months after his death in the name of his executor
or administrator, for the benefit of certain relatives.' The language
'Baker v. Bolton, r Campb. 493 (Eng. io8).
'9 and io Vict., Chap. 93.
'Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Corporation, 87 S. E. 635 (N. C. 1916).
'At the present time there are statutes in force in nearly all the states
substantially embodying the provisions of Lord Campbell's Act in so far as
the right to maintain an action for wrongful death is concerned, though
the terms of the sfatutes differ in respect to the persons entitled to maintain
such action, the persons for whose benefit the action may be maintained, the
time of bringing the action, the measure and elements of damages recov-
erable, and the distribution of the same.
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of most of the decisions is to the effect that these statutes are not
mere survival acts", which simply continue the right of action of
the party injured, but that they create a new and independent
cause of action based on the damages caused to the next of kin by
the death of the injured person.8  However, authorities are not
wanting to the effect that these acts simply continue or transmit
the right to sue which the decedent would have had if he had lived.7
This doctrine is usually based on the provision of the statute that
the act or default of the defendant must have been such as would
have entitled the deceased to recover damages in respect thereof;
but this reasoning may be answered by the argument that this pro-
vision merely defines the class of actions in which the new liability
is granted.
If Lord Campbell's act is in essence merely a "survival statute",
obviously a recovery of damages or a release by the injured party
during his lifetime would bar the maintenance of an action by his
representative after his death. But if as said by the court, in one
of the first cases that arose under the act," "this act does not
transfer this right of action to his representative, but gives to his
representative a totally new right of action, on different principles",
it may be cogently argued that the decedent cannot during his life-
time release or bar the right of action which the surviving members
of his family have for the pecuniary loss resulting to them from
his death. It is, however, quite uniformly held that where a person
whose death is caused by the wrongful act of another has, in his
lifetime, executed a due and proper release to the wrongdoer of all
claims for damages on account of the wrongful act, no right of
action for the death exists in favor of the heirs or personal repre-
sentatives of the deceased.9 From this it will be seen that too
much reliance cannot be placed on general words of the courts in
saying that Lord Campbell's act creates an entirely distinct cause
of action.
The majority of decisions, both in England and America, are
in accord with the principal case.Y0  There are, however, vigorous
dissents in many of these decisions, and a few cases actually hold
1Maiorano v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 216 Pa. 402 (19o7); Kling v. Torello,
87 Conn. 30l (1914); Michigan Cent. R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59
(913).
'Strode v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 616 (igo6); Louisville Rwy.
Co. v. Raymond, 135 Ky. 738 (19o9).
' Coleridge, J., in Blake v. Midland Rwy. Co., 21 L. J. Q. B. 233 (Eng.
1852).
'Thompson v. Rwy. Co., 97 Tex. 590 (19o4): Brown v. Chicago, etc.,
Rwy. Co., 77 N. W. 748 (Wis. x898); Southern, etc., Co. v. Cassin, Ii Ga.
55 (0oo).
"Littlewood v. N. Y., 89 N. Y. 24 (1882); Golding v. Knox, 56 Ind.
App. 149 (1914).
NO TES
the contrary view.1 The minority holding is based on the argu-
ment that the statute gives an independent right of action for the
death, and not merely for the injury; and that since this right of
action does not accrue until the death, 2 it cannot be barred by the
decedent's act.-
The reasoning of the courts holding the majority opinion is
based on various grounds. Some cases say that the question does
not turn upon whether the statutory right of action is a new right
or merely a continuation of the right of deceased, but upon the in-
tention of -the legislature as gathered from the statute.13 The
theory is that the framers of the act did not intend to create a
double liability, but merely a single cause of action for the injury,
for which there should be but one compensation. There is a further
theory that since the statute provides that the cause of action must
be one for which the decedent could have recovered if death had
not occurred, it is a condition precedent to recovery by the repre-
sentative that the injured party himself must have been able to
recover;14 and inasmuch as a recovery by the decedent would of
course bar a subsequent action by the same person, the condition
of the statute is not met.
The minority view, it seems, has much to commend it. The
statute gives a right of action which never before existed, and
which is purely the creature of that statute. By it the decedent's
family are allowed to recover for the loss to themselves, caused by
the death of the injured person, a loss which is entirely distinct
from the loss to the decedent himself. The fact that the latter
recovered damages during his lifetime for the injury to himself,
should not prevent his relatives from subsequently suing for the
loss which they suffered independently, by being deprived of the
value of his services to them. 5 It might perhaps be said in answer
that they would be compensated by the fact that the estate in which
"Donahue v. Drexler, 82 Ky. 157 (1884); Schlichting v. Wintgen, 25
Hun 626 (N. Y. i88i).
12 Bolick v. Rwy., 138 N. C. 370 (1905).
" In Littlewood v. N. Y., smpra, note Io, it is said by Rapallo, J., "The
form of expression employed in the act shows that the legislature had in
mind the case of a party entitled to maintain an action but whose right of
action was by the rule of the common law extinguished by his death, and
not the case of one who had maintained his action or who had recovered
damages."
4 See Michigan Cent. R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59 (913), at p. o.
"1 Mr. Chief Justice Clark, rendering the dissenting opinion in the prin-
cipal case, said, "Formerly such cause of action could not be maintained.
The legislature has now provided that such cause of action can be asserted.
. . . It is now asserted by the personal representative for the first time.
It has not been paid, and it has not been compromised, and it did not exist
until the death of his intestate, who could not, and indeed did not attempt
to settle for such wrongful death. . . . The damages sustained by the
wrongful death were given by the statute, and accrued subsequently to the
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they share has been increased by the amount of the judgment
recovered during the decedent's lifetime; but it is extremely doubt-
ful whether this compensation is in fact more than illusqry. More-
over, it has been held that even a judgment against the decedent
during his lifetime will act as a bar to the statutory action.16
The question is of course one of construction. The problem is
not what the legislature ought to have made the law, but what in
fact it did make the law; and the courts have apparently decided
that the intent was to subject the wrongdoer to only one action
for his wrongful act. How the courts can reconcile this with the
almost universal statement that the statute creates an entirely new,
distinct, and independent cause .of action,'" is rather difficult to
perceive.
E.E.
recovery of the judgment by the intestate for his physical injuries, and the
statute does not contemplate that payment for injuries and physical suffer-
ings to the plaintiff's intestate should bar the family of the decedent from
recovering for the loss of the value of his services to them. This is a
subsequent and greater damage, and accrues to a different party."
"Schmelzer v. Central Furniture Co., 252 Mo. 12 (1913).
17 See the cases cited supra, in note 6 and note 8.
